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Program Analysis and Verification at Microsoft

Nick Benton

Microsoft Research

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

And worse…

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TECHNOLOGY

Sasser worm spreading quickly

Tuesday, May 4, 2004 Posted: 2049 GMT (0449 HKT)

(CNN) -- Computer security experts are dealing with at least four variants of a worm that is spreading quickly through Windows operating systems.

Known as SasserA, SasserB, SasserC and SasserD, the worm is targeting Windows 2000 and Windows XP. Other Windows systems, including Windows 95, 98 and ME, could be indirectly affected.

Topic: Networking

Follow via:

Nimda worm attacks the Web

Summary: Just as the Code Red worm seemed to have died down, a new variation has arrived. But Nimda spreads by email too, and can download itself from infected Web sites. A ZDNet UK News Focus

By ZDNet UK | September 19, 2001 -- 13:47 GMT (14:47 BST)

FEATURE

Blaster worm linked to severity of blackout

Exposure of communications flaws heightens concerns about security of the U.S. power grid

By Dan Verton

Computerworld | Aug 29, 2003 1:00 AM PT

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BBC NEWS

LIVE BBC NEWS CHANNEL

Last Updated: Tuesday, 27 January, 2004, 17:33 GMT

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Mydoom virus 'biggest in months'

A computer virus spread via e-mail has been described by security experts as the "largest virus outbreak in months".

The malicious worm, called Mydoom or Novarg, has clogged networks and may allow unauthorised access to computers.

Computer users are advised to update anti-virus software

It arrives as an e-mail attachment in a text file which sends itself out to other e-mail addresses if opened.

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CNET › News › News - Business Tech

July 18, 2001 1:35 PM PDT

"Code Red" worm claims 12,000 servers

By Robert Lemos
Staff Writer, CNET News

Related Stories

Microsoft reveals Web server hole

June 18, 2001

Almost 12,000 Web servers have been infected by a new Internet worm that takes advantage of a security flaw in Microsoft software to deface sites, security experts said Wednesday. The worm could also help attackers identify infected computers and gain control of them.

PreFast, PreFix, Esp, …

Rich ecosystem of pluggable analysis tools for finding defects in C/C++ code

Established pillar of Microsoft engineering practice

Quality gate for checkins/integrations

Ship in Visual Studio

357 rules, 13 defect categories

6011	Dereferencing NULL pointer	PREfast
6387	Invalid parameter value	PREfast
6001	Using uninitialized memory	PREfast
6101	Returning uninitialized memory	PREfast
6031	Return value ignored	PREfast
6385	Read overrun	PREfast
6262	Excessive stack usage	PREfast
6386	Write overrun	PREfast
26115	Failing to release lock	EspC
28196	Returning bad result	Drivers
28719	Banned API usage	WindowsPRefast
26035	Precondition null termination violation	EspX
26018	Potential buffer overflow nullterminated	EspX

PreFast, PreFix, Esp, …

Rich ecosystem of pluggable analysis tools for finding defects in C/C++ code



26018	Potential buffer overflow nullterminated	EspX

SAL

Source code Annotation Language

Making programmer intent explicit

Consumed by analysis tools such as PreFast

Over 3 million annotations in Windows alone!

Tens of thousands of bugs found and fixed with help of SAL

Preconditions, postconditions, invariants, concurrency

```
void * memcpy(
    _Out_writes_bytes_all_(count) void *dest,
    _In_reads_bytes_(count) const void *src,
    size_t count
);

wchar_t *wmemcpy(
    _Out_writes_all_(count) wchar_t *dest,
    _In_reads_(count) const wchar_t *src,
    size_t count
);
```

SLAM and Static Driver Verifier



"Counter-example driven abstraction refinement"

SLAM: Implements CEGAR, uses Z3

Boolean program abstraction, CFL reachability

SLIC: Defines safety automaton

e.g. lock is alternately acquired and released

SDV: OS model stubs + ~200 driver rules

Ships externally with WDK

Quality gate for Windows 7 drivers at Microsoft, 270 real bugs found

90-98% of bugs reported are real, nonresults on < 3.5% of runs

Code Contracts

```
public int Max(int[] a)
{
  Contract.Requires(a != null);
  Contract.Requires(a.Length > 0);
  Contract.Ensures(Contract.ForAll(a, x => Contract.Result<int>() >= x));
  Contract.Ensures(Contract.Exists(a, x => Contract.Result<int>() == x));

  var max = a[0];
  for(var i = 0; i < a.Length; i++)
  {
    var tmp = a[i];
    if (tmp > max) max = tmp;
  }

  return max;
}
```

Contracts written in source language (C#, VB, …)

Dynamic or static checking by abstract interpretation (Clousot)

VS plugin

Used inside and outside MS (>120k downloads)

Basis for further work on automated testing, suggested repairs, contract inference, verification modulo versions

Dafny

Imperative language designed for verification of functional correctness

Built on Boogie/Z3, largely automatic
Pre/post, invariants, termination
Ghost variables, sets, sequences, alg types
Dynamic frames
Extensively used in teaching
And other verification projects in MSR

```
method ComputePow2(n: nat) returns (p: nat)
  ensures p = pow2(n);
{
  if n = 0 {
    p := 1;
  } else if n % 2 = 0 {
    p := ComputePow2(n / 2);
    p := p * p;
    Lemma(n);
  } else {
    p := ComputePow2(n-1);
    p := 2 * p;
} }
ghost method Lemma(n: nat)
  requires n % 2 = 0;
  ensures pow2(n) = pow2(n/2) * pow2(n/2);
{
  if n ≠ 0 { Lemma(n-2); }
}
```

x86 Proved

Language

```
Definition allocImp (heapinfo:DWORD)
           (bytes:nat) (fail:DWORD) :=
  mov ESI, heapinfo;;
  mov EDI, [ESI];;
  add EDI, bytes;;
  jc fail;;   (* wrap-around *)
  cmp [ESI+4], EDI;;
  jc fail;;   (* no memory *)
  mov [ESI], EDI.
```

Specification

```
Definition allocSpec n fail inv code :=
  Forall i, Forall j, (
      safe @ (EIP ~= fail ** EDI?) //\\
      safe @ (EIP ~= j ** Exists p,
                EDI ~= p +# n **
                memAny p (p +# n))
    -->>
      safe @ (EIP ~= i ** EDI?))
    @ (ESI? ** OSZCP_Any ** inv)
    <@ (i -- j :-> code).
```

Logic

```
Lemma spec_at_or_and S R1 R2
    {HNeg: AtContra S}:
  S @ (R1 \\// R2) |-- S @ R1 //\\ S @ R2.
Proof.
  rewrite ->land_is_forall, lor_is_exists.
  transitivity (Forall b,
  S @ (if b then R1 else R2)); last first.
  - apply: lforallR => [[|]].
    - by apply lforallL with true.
    - by apply lforallL with false.
  apply: at_ex'.
Qed.
```

Compiler

```
| TOP dword op dst ShiftCountCL =>
  encodeOpcode dword #x"D2" $$
  writeNext (inj op, dst)

| IMUL dst src =>
  writeNext #x"0F" $$
  writeNext #x"AF" $$
  writeNext (inj dst, src)
```

```
jmp (nth #0 cmap (size noblocks).-1)
```

Coq

Proof

```
 (* mov [ESI], EDI *)
specintro. move/eqP => Hcarry0.
subst carry0.
specapply MOV_M0R_rule.
- by ssimpl.
rewrite <-spec_reads_frame.
apply limplValid.
autorewrite with push_at.
 apply: landL2. cancel1.
 rewrite /OSZCP_Any /flagAny /regAny
    /allocInv. ssplits.
```

Binary

```
"BB 00 80 0B 00 E9 0B 00 00
 43 01 4F FF C3 FF C3 81 FB
 82 E9 FF FF FF BE 00 80 0B
 00 E9 10 00 00 00 8B 06 89
 00 00 81 C7 04 00 00 00 81
 0F 82 E4 FF FF FF B9 14 00
 00 00 BF D1 06 30 00 C1 E2
   03 FA C1 EA 07 C6 04 4F
   0F 84 07 00 00 00 FF
   00 00 00 00 81 FA 31
   00 00 FF C2 E9 05 00
```

```
Inductive NonSPReg := | EAX | EBX | ECX |
EDX | ESI | EDI | EBP.
(* General purpose registers,
   including ESP *)
Inductive Reg :=
| nonSPReg :> NonSPReg -> Reg
| ESP.
(* All registers, including EIP
   but excluding EFL *)
Inductive AnyReg :=
| regToAnyReg :> Reg -> AnyReg
| EIP.
```

x86 Architecture

```
| MUL src =>
 let! v1 = getRegFromProcState EAX;
 let! v2 = evalRegMem src;
 let res := fullmulB v1 v2 in
 let cfof := high 32 res == #0 in
 do! setRegInProcState EAX (low 32 res);
 do! setRegInProcState EDX (high 32 res);
 do! updateFlagInProcState CF cfof;
 do! updateFlagInProcState OF cfof;
 do! forgetFlagInProcState SF;
 do! forgetFlagInProcState PF;
 forgetFlagInProcState ZF
```

x86 Semantics

- Visual Studio Code Analysis
  - http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms182025.aspx
- SAL
  - http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms182032.aspx
- SLAM & Static Driver Verifier
  - http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/slam/
- Code Contracts
  - http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/contracts/
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- x86proved
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